Cleveland Indians GM Mark Shapiro is inclined to identifying the 40-game mark of a given season as the initial point at which assessments of a team may be legitimately made. Anything deduced earlier than that is reactionary, perhaps, illusion at the worst. Rash, at least.
Weather permitting, the 2008 campaign should arrive at that juncture with the completion of Wednesday's contest with Oakland.
Having won five of its last seven, the club is currently at .500, its 18 wins accompanied by as many losses. Some very recent outbursts have served to somewhat obscure what has been a horrible first half offensively, with almost every player responsible for a share of those difficulties.
The team is last among the 14 AL clubs in triples and total bases, the latter distinction by a whopping 21 bags. It ranks 13th in BA and slugging percentage, eleventh in doubles and steals, tenth in homers and ninth in both walks and rbi. Amazingly, it is but a half-game out of first in its division. Not so amazingly, only five AL outfits have more K's.
Among regulars, only catcher Victor Martinez has an average worth boasting about (an AL-leading .346), but he has yet to homer, has scored only 8 runs and driven in an extremely modest 14, given the average and his being situated in the cleanup role. Some of that can be attributed to his hamstring woes, but moreso it is attributable to deficient table-setting in front of him and protection behind him.
In fact, the customary five-hole designee is 8th on the team in rbi despite being 3rd in ABs and tied for first in homers. So sporadic has been that man's run production that he is tied in rbi (13) with a teammate (David Dellucci) having 29 fewer AB. That player is also second on the club in strike outs, last in OBP, ninth in doubles---where he is tied by someone having 95 fewer at bats---and scarsely ahead of only two regulars in BA.
This player is, of course, Jhonny Peralta. Credit the PD's Terry Pluto with revealing that Peralta, hitting .216 overall, is but .209 vs. RHP and .143 with RISP.
In utmost deference to Shapiro's standard for patience, it is time to ask: "Why is this guy still a starter? Why is he so regularly in the five-hole? Why is he considered a core piece? Why is he not being shipped elsewhere in exchange for something with upside?"
Credit, too, Manager Eric Wedge with finally sitting the guy again for Game One and for saying, in the Sunday Plain Dealer: "From a discipline standpoint, he's played long enough (You're telling me!) where he understands what he needs to do to be successful and what gets him into trouble." Also in his Indians Insider, beat reporter Paul Hoynes paraphrases Wedge as indicating he would like to see more consistency at the plate from Peralta.
I beg to differ. It would seem Peralta has been quite consistent indeed. What he is is ill-equipped. What is happening is he's being mis-employed. He's mis-cast. He's clearly not a five-hole bat, nor is he deserving of core-piece consideration. It should not have required 40 games to conclude this much, either.
What is more is Peralta sat and witnessed, as did thousands of Tribe fans, what playing SS at the MLB level should look like. During Saturday's contest, second-year man Asdrubal Cabrera was permitted to perform at his native position and executed at least three stellar defensive plays that Peralta quite likely would never have converted into outs, as each required the shortstop to go deep into the hole and throw across his body while on the run to edge a Toronto batsman. Though Jhonny has one of the game's better infield arms, he lacks the range, body control and quickness to match what Cabrera displayed on those three grounders.
It had to have occurred to everyone watching, Peralta included, that the club might be far better served---particularly inasmuch as it is so conspicuously constructed around its starting pitching---were it to henceforth feature Cabrera as its everyday shortstop.
Though this is a thought articulated by many, this writer included, dating back to Cabrera's emergence late last summer, it remains the company line that "Peralta's bat is needed in the lineup." This perspective was echoed dutifully, in fact, by a host on the club's cable production typically preceding television broadcasts.
Is it really so that this organization is beholden to someone with such horrific offensive numbers, particularly when they come attached to a player who remains undisciplined in the box, can't run and displays less-than-average major-league SS range? Are those aforementioned numbers really those of an indispensible component part?
Is this not the same guy who has yet to have an 80-rbi campaign? What is the fascination with this player?
It had been proposed, at the start of the off-season and again before spring training, that Peralta be converted to 2b, where similarly over-sized middle-infielders (Bobby Grich, Jeff Kent, et al) have gravitated and succeeded due to lessened range requirements. Third base was also mentioned, as the organization is seemingly without succession behind Casey Blake, a reality that resulted in his $6 million contact and the retention of Andy Marte.
Alas, neither option was/has been pursued.
What is offered as defense of that resistance has been the nonsensical argument perpetrated by Shapiro and inexplicably embraced and echoed by certain media cronies. It holds that Peralta's anticipated offensive potential at SS (as well Victor's at catcher and Grady's in CF) is needed to negate what is being sacrificed at the traditional power spots in the corners of both the infield and the outfield---as if the arrangements were mutually-exclusive. (Why must it be either one or the other? Cannot it be both instead of either?)
In other words, just because you possess offense at traditionally non-offensive positions does not mean you must not have offense at the traditional corner spots.
It is furthermore absurd because both Cabrera and Peralta would still appear in the regular lineup, even if Jhonny moved to 2b and Asdrubal at SS? The offensive contributors would be identical but the D would be enhanced.
One must deduce the organization is really saying it is desirous of preserving Peralta's maximum value, something that might be compromised were Jhonny to become a 2b or 3b. But shouldn't present success be the priority over potential liquidation value? The front office can't truly believe it is better all-around continuing to invest in Peralta as its SS, when a clearly superior defensive option exists in-house?
Even should it be the brass was protecting itself against Cabrera's being an aberration, wouldn't adding SS depth been wiser than maintaining the status quo?
Therefore, there must be something about what is needed from a 2b that Peralta lacks. Certainly, his arm would be an asset on the dp. It must be the turn he can't perform. As a 3b, he may lack the reactions for the hot corner, where the ball tends to arrive much more quickly than it does at SS.
The aforementioned Pluto, in his Sunday notes column, wrote: "When some tribe fans want a major trade, they usually suggest dealing veteran players they don't like. But that does not happen because other teams have scouts and televisions, too."
On the surface, this too seems to hold some merit. But it might also be said the Cleveland organization cannot have it both ways. A regular who possesses no marketability whatsoever should not be someone playing almost daily, much less in the five hole, as if his presence were essential to the team's contention.
If it is to be assumed true that such a player is integral to whatever winning might be had, how could it be he'd have no market value were liquidation investigated?
Peralta should be believable in a conversation to acquire a future 3b, then, right?
It must be acknowledged, however, that Cabrera (.194) is one of only two starters---much-maligned DH Travis Hafner (.215) is the other---hitting less well than Peralta's .216. But Cabrera has only two fewer rbi in 18 fewer ABs. And it is not Asdrubal who immediately follows Martinez' excellent .384OBP in the batting order.
Particularly inasmuch as JP is second on the club in total bases and has enjoyed such favorable designation in the order, Peralta's production should be bearing far more fruit. He simply is not a quality run producer. It is a mistake to expect him to perform as one, a judgment for which Shapiro and Wedge are responsible.
Now that 40 games are nearly in the book, perhaps the brass is ready to acknowledge the errors it has made relative to Peralta's employment---both in the field and at the plate. He's been remarkably overrated heretofore---or he is woefully under-achieving. Similarly, they may be regretting their relative non-activity last offseason where personnel adjustments are concerned.
As that sentence was written, Cabrera just turned yet another play Peralta could only dream of, ranging far to his left to snag a Blue Jay grounder behind second to begin a double-play with a glove-flip to Jamey Carroll.
It would seem this entry is holding Peralta primarily responsible for the Indians' 2008 offensive struggles, as well as their inability to parlay superb starting pitching into some significant distance between themselves and their AL Central competitors. To be clear, it is moreso the decision-makers who are to blame.
Shapiro may be the reigning MLB Executive of the Year and Wedge the Manager of the Year, but theirs has not been stellar foresight. Peralta's persistance in their plans as exclusively a SS, as well as his reliance as a meat-of-the-order run-producer, are not their only failings. Choosing to invest in a LF platoon of Dellucci and the now-departed Jason Michaels is another. There is a litany of other evidence, involving names like Marte, Phillips, Guthrie, Chuch, Scott, Izturis, Tavares, Barton, et al.; but why rehash such garbage? What they are able to do about remediation moving forward is truly the question.
For example, how married will they remain to Ryan Garko at 1b? He's apparently not potent enough to utilize fifth between Victor and Travis. He is another who cannot run and---again crediting Pluto---is at .195 vs. RHP. He's unremarkable defensively, despite his dedication to hard work, except to be horrid on pop-ups nearing the stands. What is more, he currently road-blocks the only two genuine bat prospects at Buffalo, where 4-A types predominate again.
Those candidates are lefties Michael Aubrey (.345) and Jordan Brown, the organization's top minor-leaguer two years running. Especially since he is finally healthy---after appearing in only 243 games in the past five years, research attributed to PD's Dennnis Manoloff---the suddenly-26-year-old former number-one pick Aubrey could be the beneficiary of what has begun with the promotion of vet OF Jason Tyner.
Tyner, a non-roster spring invitee, replaces the too-seldom-used RHR Tom Mastny, at least until Jeremy Sowers is recalled for a May 19th start in Cinn. (Credit Hoynes for this, too.) Tyner's arrival signals a departure from the 12-pitchers/13 position guys composition as to the 25-man roster. It could be Tyner (or 3b Andy Marte) will become designated to open a spot for Sowers' return. After the LHP's start, it could be Aubrey who inherits the roster spot, possibly in at least a 1b platoon with Garko.
Admittedly, the more likely scenario would elevate the rehabbing LH OF Shin-Soo Choo, though he is not a 1b and would be wasted athletically to become one. Choo can be farmed for rehab purposes up to 20 days, so there figures to be a window of about 10 games during which Aubrey could be auditioned before a decision must be made about activating Shin-Soo.
What might eventually evolve is a late-summer package involving Garko and RHP Paul Byrd. By that time, Jake Westbrook would be back and re-entered into the rotation. Other clubs would be even more acutely aware of their need for a vet starter like Paul, an $8 mil/yr. commodity entering the final months of his contract.
With CC, Fausto, Jake, Cliff and Laffey available, and Sowers, Adam Miller (wishful thinking?) and Brian Slocum in the pipeline, Byrd and/or Garko could present the brass with something of value to exchange for a possibly-needed bat.
That is why it should be understood Ben Francisco and Choo have about two months' time to demonstrate they can be in-house solutions for an ailing offense. Testing Aubrey during that interim might also be astute, advisable and precautionary.
It has been the first 40-games, the quartermark, that have suggested much of this. The next 40 figure to more completely tell the tale of the season in general. Here is hoping the front office does not continue its ill-advised posture of standing pat. There are moves to consider and others to make. What should be sufficiently apparent is what has reigned has not been good enough, as the stats more than the standings attest.